9780521644150

Overview

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.

ISBN-13

9780521644150

ISBN-10

0521644151

Weight

1.30 Pounds

Dimensions

6.00 x 0.91 x 9.00 In

List Price

$53.99

Edition

1st Edition

Format

Paperback

Language

English

Pages

364 pages

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Published On

1999-08-26



View All Offers

Sort by:

Condition
Seller
Seller Comments
Price
Used, Like New
Seller details
GreatBookPrices-
★★★★☆

Columbia, MD, USA

100% Money Back Guarantee. Brand New, Perfect Condition. We offer expedited shipping to all US locat...
$72.49

 Free delivery by: 30 Mar 2026

Used, Good
Seller details
Bonita
★★★★☆

Santa Clarita, CA, USA

Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book.
$103.67

 Free delivery by: 30 Mar 2026

Brand New
Seller details
Bonita
★★★★☆

Santa Clarita, CA, USA

$139.37

 Free delivery by: 30 Mar 2026


Bookstores.com relies on cookies to improve your experience.